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NEGOTIATING THE BALKANS 
A Regional Approach to a Negotiated Arrangement for the Balkans on the 
Way to Europe  
 
The following concept for a sustainable arrangement for the Balkans may be 
characterised as process-oriented, regional as well as non-partisan, but driven by 
basic principles. The normative element concerns the rules of the negotiation 
process: A partisan stance or the imposition of a final solution to the open 
questions would run counter to the regional ownership of the process. In this 
concept the EU would be the international key actor to impose framework 
conditions for both the negotiation process and resulting agreements as well as to 
provide mediation and incentives for constructive and responsible participation 
in the process. Stabilising a region of functioning constitutional states has 
priority in the process, as the relentless assertion of rights of national self-
determination would result in ever-more fragile states striving for European 
alimentation rather than integration. Last, but not least, the issues are linked in 
political praxis, even if not in terms of international or constitutional law. 
Therefore, a comprehensive regional process towards a final arrangement should 
take precedence over issue-by-issue unilateral decisions or separate bilateral 
agreements.  
Premises 
Both the international community and the political leaders of the region are 
obliged to use the current window of opportunity to negotiate a sustainable 
arrangement for the Balkans. The Balkan Forum’s recommendations for this 
regional negotiation process are based on six premises: 
1. The conflicts of the past decade in the Balkan region have their roots to a 
large extent in the nature of the disintegration process of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), which has been neither controlled nor 
consolidated. Thus, arrangements dealing with open issues of state-building 
should have stabilising effects for the region.  
2. Since the end of the Kosovo War, several events and developments have 
created an unprecedented window of opportunity for negotiating long-term 
stability for the Balkan region as well as for progress on integration in Euro-
Atlantic structures. This window of opportunity relates to the decision taken 
at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 to open accession 
negotiations with Romania and Bulgaria; the solemn promise of an EU 
integration perspective for the countries of the region in the form of a 
Stabilisation and Association Process; and, last but not least, the change of 
regime in Zagreb as well as in Belgrade one year later.  
3. In the circumstances of the incongruency of states and ethnic nations on the 
Balkans, an absolute priority for national self-determination is bound to end 
in a downward spiral of state fragmentation and inter-ethnic violence. Thus, 
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any future-oriented strategy in a framework of regional stabilisation and 
European integration will have to consider other, non-ethnic motives and 
interests.  
4. The numerous unresolved issues of the region are linked in praxis, the 
intricacies and ambiguities of international or constitutional law 
notwithstanding. The linkages depend on political activists’ ability to make a 
credible case for such implications and to mobilise a constituency on this 
basis. Thus, these linkages are constructed rather than essential, but 
nevertheless constitute powerful factors of unpredictability and obstruction in 
regional politics. 
5. Irrespective of its final status, Kosovo has to be turned into a functioning 
(i.e., responsible and self-governing) state-entity in the short term, to allow 
for a process of market-reform and democratisation to take shape. Thus, 
UNMIK would gradually limit its management to key decisions and 
supervision, while reducing the de facto protectorate status of Kosovo in line 
with UNSC Res. 1244. Provincial elections (as fixed for November 17, 2001) 
and a corresponding Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-
Government (as proclaimed on Mai 15, 2001) are prerequisites for a process 
towards Kosovar self-government. 
6. Ultimately, the status of Kosovo and Montenegro belongs to the agenda of 
the regional negotiation process. Initiating a negotiation process in the short 
term and creating a perspective for a final arrangement does not conflict with 
the international consensus on longer, concise interim arrangements. At the 
same time, the option of independence is not incompatible with international 
policy if current borders are respected (i.e. upgraded to state borders, but not 
changed geographically) and if independence is the result of a fair 
negotiation process.  
Negotiating a Regional Arrangement  
The lesson of recent Balkan history is that neither an unrelenting implementation 
of the principle of national self-determination and the ideal of ethnically 
homogeneous nation-states, nor a dogmatic defence of the status quo of states 
offers a long-term perspective for regional stability. As long as conflict parties 
strive uncompromisingly for their preferred solution and insist on a 
corresponding finalité to the nation and state building processes, regional 
stability will remain a chimera. The plurality of conflicting and incompatible 
claims – both current and potential – in the region defies any “solution” in a 
strict sense. Protracted processes of disintegration would be bound to create 
ever-new claims and revitalise conflict potentials. The only real option is a 
pragmatic combination of responsive long-term diplomacy and a concise 
negotiation process. Regional stability as a prerequisite for the realisation of the 
long-term perspective of integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions has to be based 
on an “arrangement” rather than a “solution”. Any “arrangement” implies 
compromises and suboptimal results for all parties involved and requires a priori 
the respect for the legitimacy of other claims and interests. Thus, the 
involvement of the major democratic political parties in each state and state-like 
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entity in the negotiations is key to the sustainability of the arrangement, as they 
implicitly accept responsibility and ownership of the resulting bi- and 
multilateral agreements.  
In a dual sense, a regional approach is the only consistent strategy: The current 
consensus in the region concerning the priority objective of integration in Euro-
Atlantic structures, first and foremost the European Union, implies acceptance of 
regionality. The regional approach is at the heart of the Stability Pact and 
informs the EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process too. At the same time, 
the multitude of complex links between the controversial issues of nation and 
state building – both current and potential – in the region defies any unilateral, 
bilateral solutions. Thus, in order to prevent the destabilisation of the region by 
the emergence of ever-new issues and arcane package deals or by irresponsible 
and uncommitted elites, a comprehensive (both in terms of issues and in terms of 
political actors involved), regional negotiation process should be initiated.  
Domestic Transparency and Responsibility 
Any meaningful and effective negotiation process requires equal participation 
and mandated representatives of all states involved. Depending on the agenda-
setting in the pre-negotiation phase, all former republics of the SFRY (including 
Slovenia) ought to participate or, conversely, Albania should be included from a 
regional perspective.  
In the case of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the basic requirement of equal 
representation poses a threefold problem:  
1. The representatives of Kosovo and Montenegro as non-independent entities 
would have to accept both the federal and the Serbian governments as 
negotiating partners. Non-acceptance of either the Yugoslav or the Serbian 
representation would invalidate the negotiation process. This can only be 
achieved if all parties publicly confirm that this acceptance for the sake of 
negotiations does not prejudice any decision on the status issues.  
2. The negotiation process also depends on the provincial elections in Kosovo, 
scheduled for November 17, 2001, and the subsequent installation of a 
democratic parliament and a provincial government as well as on the 
proclamation of an Interim Statute defining the competencies of these 
Kosovar provincial authorities. 
3. The Yugoslav and Serbian authorities in Belgrade would have to accept 
their counterparts in Podgorica and Prishtina equal negotiating parties, but 
not as independent entities. This can only be achieved if both sides publicly 
confirm that this acceptance for the sake of negotiations does not prejudice 
any decision on the unresolved status issues. Consequently, the negotiation 
process precludes unilateral steps pertaining to the status of Kosovo and 
Montenegro.  
These issues cannot be resolved satisfactorily by a legal approach, as the 
constitutions in/of the FRY are contradictory and disputed. The Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia has lost much of its authority in current state praxis, albeit not its 
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prerogatives in terms of constitutional rights and international status. Therefore, 
without prejudicing the outcome of negotiations, the international community 
has a special commitment towards the FRY in mediating between the parties. 
Overall, the issue of representations requires political (good)will rather than 
legal arguments.  
Having democratically elected governments of all states and state-like entities 
represented at the negotiation table as equal partners may not suffice for a robust 
and durable arrangement. (Radical) changes of government within the window 
of opportunity and the general exclusion of major opposition parties or ethnic-
minority parties concerned would invalidate the results of the negotiations. Some 
of the issues on the negotiation table and subsequent arrangements are bound to 
have the status of a referendum issue or constitutional amendment. Thus, 
preferably, each state or state-like entity would be under the obligation to include 
all relevant domestic parties in the delegation (with the proviso that each party 
explicitly rejects violence as a policy instrument, accepts the other delegations as 
equal negotiating counterparts, and pledges to respect their legitimate interests as 
a basis for negotiations). One option would be to choose the presidium of the 
respective parliaments as the appropriate broad democratic basis for a delegation 
to the negotiations.  
Pre-negotiations should clarify the agenda, solve the issue of representations and 
determine the procedures. Procrastination in the pre-negotiation phase would 
have to be curbed by the conditionality of international assistance and the 
political leverage of EU and US to provide positive and negative incentives. Key 
precondition for opening the actual negotiations is the signing of a formal 
declaration including the authorisation of the international mediators and a 
catalogue of binding principles along the following lines: All negotiating parties 
must  
1. ... renounce violence as a instrument of solving political conflicts and pledge 
to isolate those propagating and using violence to promote their political 
views. 
2. ... refrain from unilateral steps pertaining to the status of Kosovo and 
Montenegro. 
3. ... recognise and respect the (conflicting) interests and positions of the other 
negotiating parties as equal, legitimate and a basis for negotiations. 
4. … be committed to full co-operation with the International War Crimes 
Tribunal in The Hague. 
5. ... respect the norms of the Helsinki Process and the basic criteria of the 
Stability Pact and the Stabilisation and Association Process: human and 
minority rights, inviolability of borders (both international borders and 
republican/provincial borders within the FRY), reforms towards pluralist 
democracy and market economy.  
The normative preconditions listed above are based on the following 
consideration: The sum of the preconditions makes for negotiations on the basis 
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of the regional status quo rather than inviting arcane package deals and the 
assertion of specific interests in an inextricable process with all options open.  
The interest of all parties is in a robust and transparent negotiation process as 
regional stability contributes to economic development and regional trade co-
operation. It also contributes to a the strengthening of functioning governments 
contending with militant nationalists or belligerent rebels.  
The Role of the International Community 
Regional ownership of the negotiation process does not argue against a key role 
for the international community. International interference in processes of nation 
and state building is not an exception, but the rule and, in contrast to 19th and 20th 
century precedents, the international community should now act as guarantor of 
regional stability and accepted principles rather than great power interests. The 
concept of an indigenous, regional negotiation process determines and limits the 
role of the international community as an external actor. Without forcing any 
final status solutions in the open-ended negotiation process, the international 
mediators nevertheless play a key role in setting the framework conditions for 
the negotiations and providing incentives for a constructive dialogue. 
The increased profile of the EU as guarantor of security and stability in the 
Balkans and the perspective of a long-term integration process preordain the 
European Union’s leading role in the negotiations. The assistance and 
advantages offered by the Stability Pact and, most of all, the Stabilisation and 
Association Process towards EU integration constitute key incentives for 
constructive negotiations. Therefore, the envisioned negotiation process for the 
region should be institutionally affiliated with the EU as a norm-setting 
organisation. Democratic representatives, moreover, should have ownership of 
the regional negotiation process. With the EU as operative lead-organisation in 
the mediation process, the UN and the International Contact Group with its wider 
membership would be in the role of guarantors of the negotiation process as 
international acceptance of the resulting arrangements requires the involvement 
of the USA, the Russian Federation, the EU and the key European states. A high-
profiled negotiator or a small negotiation team of international repute with 
experience and prestige in the region should be authorised to lead the actual 
mediation. A mandate by the UNSC, although not an absolute prerequisite, 
would substantially enhance the authority of the international mediators and the 
process as a whole. A regional negotiation process does not imply multilateral 
negotiations on each issue: Rather, each bilateral dialogue on an issue with 
implications for the whole region should be transparent to all parties and 
whenever appropriate, parallel bilateral negotiations should be cross-linked. 
Transparency is guaranteed by the broad parliamentary basis of each delegation 
as well as by the international authorisation of negotiated agreements. 
Confidence-building measures and symbolic gestures at an early stage of may 
enhance trust in the negotiation process.  
Apart from setting the preconditions and framework for negotiations and 
providing mediation, the international community also contributes incentives and 
disincentives to bolster the authority of the mediators and to encourage 
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constructive negotiations. The key challenge is to apply sanctions and incentives 
for the sake of the negotiation process, not for a partisan position concerning the 
result of negotiations. This requires a consensus of the international community 
in advance and close co-ordination during the process. 
The sanctions and (dis)incentives available to the international community 
should be applied in consensus and in conformity with transparent guidelines. 
Overall, positive incentives in terms of substantial and reliable international 
assistance under the Stability Pact, IFI credits and progress on the SAP trajectory 
towards EU membership should be ranked higher than negative sanctions.  
Issues Open to Negotiation 
The catalogue of negotiable issues consists of three categories: (1) unresolved 
issues related to the Yugoslav disintegration process of the past ten years; (2) 
issues directly and inseparable linked to the status questions; and (3) prospective 
non-status issues related to the processes of regional integration and integration 
in Euro-Atlantic structures. Evidently, the distinction between status and non-
status issues is subjective and may shift during the negotiation process (e.g., 
confidence-building measures might induce the relevant parties to acknowledge 
that negotiations/agreements on specific issues do no prejudice status issues). 
Consequently, other issues belong to the internal affairs (4) of the states/entities 
involved, but remain open to international supervision or dialogue.  
The international community would be party to the various bilateral and 
multilateral agreements, acting as guarantor and monitor, both in international 
and internal issues. The negotiation process were to produce basic treaties: 
internal agreements between majority and minorities of the states as well as 
external agreements between each state or state-like entity and its neighbours. 
Minority legislation (and its implementation) would be scrutinised for its 
adherence to European standards by benchmarking rather than prescription by 
the international community. 
Not to act would leave the field wide open for strategies of violence as well as 
for secret negotiations and questionable deals with a high potential for 
destabilisation. Moreover, next to all regional actors have come to accept that the 
status quo of state structures and sovereignty in the FRY is de facto 
dysfunctional, if not de jure defunct. Therefore, the preferred set-up and outcome 
of negotiations rather than the need for a negotiated rearrangement as such is the 
matter of dispute.         
(1) Issues of Disintegration  
The uncontrolled and violent disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation has left a 
legacy of conflict potentials:  
The most basic issue is the legal succession of states with all resulting 
obligations and rights. This may include access to harbours, natural resources or 
religious or historic sites. It also concerns the serving international debts and the 
sharing out of state property and other assets.  
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One of the most relevant unresolved issues in this category with a high conflict 
potential is the absence of full border demarcation between the former Yugoslav 
republics and provinces. Typically, on the premise of the inviolability of borders, 
border demarcation agreements do not impinge on the status questions as the 
future status of the respective borders may change irrespective of its 
demarcation. Demarcation contributes to the elimination of grey zones and the 
consolidation of stable relations. 
In a process of state restructuring, international security guarantees as 
accompanying measures contribute to the stabilisation of the process. Guarantees 
would concern not only borders and inter-state conflict, but also other armed 
threats to the legal order in recognised states and entities. Thus, international 
security guarantees would release budgetary and human resources absorbed for 
national and regional reform priorities by reducing security threats.    
The return of refugees is a key issue for which case-by-case pragmatic solutions 
have to be found. Bilateral agreements to support a process of reintegration or a 
concerted policy of resettlement may both be monitored by neighbouring home-
states and/or international organisations such as the OSCE.  
(2) Status Issues 
Acceptance of the fact that the Yugoslav Federation exists as a state in terms of 
international law (albeit to a much more limited extent as a functioning state) 
implies that the issues of the final status of Kosovo and Montenegro are 
interdependent. A unilateral Montenegrin declaration of independence would 
mean the end of the Yugoslav Federation and turn the question of the future of 
Kosovo into a Serbian-Kosovar issue. 
The final status of Montenegro now becomes a pivotal issue: In the April 2001 
elections pro-independence forces won by a small margin, too small a margin for 
a declaration of independence to become an domestic consensus. Unilateral 
independence is bound to create regional and internal conflict and instability. 
Therefore, serious negotiations should be opened on the basis of the two 
platforms. From a Montenegrin perspective, a federation of two states as unequal 
as Montenegro and Serbia (without Kosovo) in population and geographic size 
would be hard to imagine and even harder to implement in a meaningful way. 
In the case of Kosovo’s final status the positions of Belgrade and Prishtina are 
much more incompatible than in the case of Montenegro. A return to the status 
quo ante (i.e. 1974) is as unacceptable to any Kosovar leader as full 
independence would be for Belgrade, while the international community insists 
on the inviolability of borders and thus rejects exchanges of territories (e.g. 
Preshevo Valley for the Mitrovica region). Nevertheless, the Montenegrin case 
might offer a model as the two platforms representing the starting positions and a 
commitment by each side for negotiations contribute to a constructive and in-
depth dialogue. A dialogue on functional divisions of competencies and areas of 
co-operation might create new options for an arrangement on the issue of 
sovereignty.  
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From the perspective of the current status quo, negotiations for a new 
arrangement for Montenegro and/or Kosovo might realistically probe two 
different paths. One option would be negotiated separation followed by a 
negotiated agreement on new forms of delegated sovereignty in a (con)federal or 
loose framework. Alternatively, a new framework might be agreed upon before 
the admittedly dysfunctional FRY is dissolved.  
In each case the new framework might be considered “work in progress:” The 
central level of the tripartite framework might start as a consensus of minimal 
(representative) functions and competencies - not based on the precedent of the 
FRY. Depending on the interests and consensus of the three sovereign partners, 
the framework might gradually gain in substance and sustainability. A tripartite 
framework would be more balanced in terms of relative weights and would be 
readily accepted by the international community to prevent a new destabilising 
va-banque of nation and state building. Such a “three plus zero” federation might 
be a robust interim arrangement, allowing for functional states and regional co-
operation without prejudicing any option for the final status. Such an 
arrangement would leave open the options of both a velvet divorce - full 
independence after a “probation period” - and a gradual, functional strengthening 
of the shared institutions by consent. 
(3) Issues of Integration  
The regional consensus prioritising integration in Euro-Atlantic structures should 
help to convert issues of SFRY disintegration into issues of regional and 
European integration. A key issue for the Balkans is enhancing co-operation 
along functional lines in policy areas relevant for regional stabilisation, the 
transformation process and the fulfilment of EU and NATO criteria.  
Stimulating regional trade flows and economic co-operation requires installation 
of free-trade regimes, harmonisation of legislation and co-ordination among the 
relevant institutions of states and state-like entities. 
Regional co-operation also requires transparent and uniform visa and border 
regimes. Conversely, co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs with the 
corresponding harmonisation of procedures and legislation would contribute to 
EU pre-accession. At the same time, the fight against corruption and organised 
crime is an absolute priority in view of the socio-economic disparities and 
conflict potentials in the region. 
For a region of at least five small to medium-size states, co-operation in foreign 
representation as well as foreign-policy co-ordination in relevant international 
organisations would contribute to an effective use of resources and maximise 
regional influence on international policy-making. The same applies to regional 
co-operation in military affairs ranging from army procurement to joint 
initiatives for peace keeping or crisis management. Foreign policy co-ordination 
among the states of the region would simulate a future EU membership, as 
regional co-operation would be the only option for a meaningful say in policy 
making in a future European Union with 32 or more members.    
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(4) Internal Affairs  
By setting the rules and limits of the negotiations, the international community 
essentially fixes the line between domestic and international/regional issues. 
That is to say, legal and other arrangements for ethnic and religious minorities or 
regions within the borders of each of the seven states and entities of the Western 
Balkans are within the competence of the democratic regimes of these states and 
entities and have to be solved within those borders. Thus, the procedures of 
minority protection, regional decentralisation, language rights or interethnic 
dialogue are left to the elected parliaments and governments: The quality and 
implementation of these commitments, however, are subject to international 
monitoring and scrutiny (e.g. in the framework of the SAP).  
This distinction between negotiable and internal affairs, evidently, does not 
preclude cross-border-co-operation agreements among co-nationals or a special 
relation of a minority to a neighbouring homeland. Such arrangements are 
appropriate, but not obligatory for typical cases of a mismatch of nation and 
state: Serbs and Muslims in Sandzak, Albanians in Northern Macedonia, Serbs in 
the Republika Srpska, Hungarians in the Vojvodina, Albanians in Preshevo 
Valley, etc.  
Similarly, the Vergangenheitsbewältigung – coming to terms with the national 
and regional past as a process of social catharsis rather than criminal justice – 
clearly belongs to the national prerogatives. Again, however, a regional dialogue 
might contribute substantially to the process.  
Negotiating the Balkans  
As the objective of stability on the Balkans cannot be achieved by the selective 
application of either the principle of national self-determination or the principle 
of state sovereignty, regional stability has to be declared the key principle. A 
regional approach for stabilisation of the Balkans forbids a choice between 
Albanians and Serbs as stabilising power and (thereby) preferred partner of the 
international community. Only functioning states (in terms of market economy 
and good governance) can counter nationalist conflicts and erode the trend of 
state fragmentation along ethnic lines. New dynamic arrangements for 
competencies and sovereignty would replace the FRY structures.  
After a decade of regional conflict and with the long strenuous process towards 
EU membership ahead, neither regional frameworks alone nor the European 
framework alone can stabilise the Balkans. The only viable option to achieve 
progress in building functioning state structures is a robust combination of 
regional and European integration. 
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